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RECENT DECISIONS
Restitution-Right of Purchaser in Default Under Sale of Goods
Contract to Recover Down Payment-Desiring to purchase a number of
steers, the purchaser entered into two separate written contracts with
the respective defendants. Both contracts were similar. Each called for
a down payment, delivery of steers, and, after acceptance, payment of
the balance of the purchase price. Pursuant to the terms of the con-
tracts, the purchaser made the respective down payments and accepted
delivery of a number of the steers. Thereafter, he refused to accept
further deliveries and instituted the present suit to recover the balance
of the down payments. In the trial court, the jury found that the defen-
dants were ready, able, and willing to perform the contract and that the
plaintiff breached it. The defendant sellers upon the breach sold the cattle
without damage or loss to themselves. Held: Under the law of New
Mexico, where the purchaser, under an executory contract to sell, hav-
ing made a down payment on the purchase price, refuses, without
justification, to accept delivery of the subject matter of sale, and the
seller is ready, able, and willing to perform in accordance with the
terms of the contract, the purchaser will not be permitted to recover
back such down payment. Kaufmann vs. Baldridge, 162 Fed (2nd)
793 (1947).
In deciding this case, two distinct propositions were presented to
the court. In the first place, it would appear to be a violation of the
terms of the contract to permit a plaintiff in default to recover. In
effect the court would be rewriting the contract the parties entered into
and inserting terms they omitted. In the second place, to deny re-
covery often would give the defendant more than a fair compensation
for the injury he sustained and would impose a forfeiture on the
plaintiff.
. In arriving at its decision, this court used as a basis the New
Mexico supreme court holding in the case of Dunken v..Guess' which
was followed in Bell v. Lammon.2 It is interesting to note in this con-
nection that not only these cases but also those which served as a basis
for these decisions involved land contracts.3 One might question
whether the same principles should apply in sales of ordinary chattels
as apply in the sale of interests in land.
When a vendee has defaulted upon his contract, in absence of
express terms to the contrary, his rights under the contract to recover
prior down payment cease. However, because of the dislike felt toward
forfeitures, the defaulting vendee may have a right of action in quasi-
1 Dunken v. Guess, 40 N.M. 156, 56 P. (2nd) 1123 (1936).2 Bell v. Lammon, 51 N.M. 133, 179 P. (2nd) 757 (1947).3 Hansbrough v. Peck, 5 Wall. 497, 18 Law. Ed. 520 (1867) ; Glock v. Howard
and Wilson Colony Co., 123 Calif. 1, 55 P. 713, 43 L.R.A. 199 (1898); Turn-
bow v. Keller, 142 Ore. 200, 19 P. (2nd) 1089 (1933).
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contract.4 In general, it may be said that the courts are split between
two different approaches. Some courts are inclined to grant relief
where the defaulting plaintiff has by his part performance conferred a
benefit upon the defendant, and regard the character of the breach
or the intention of the party in default as immaterial.5 The reason
for such a policy is brought out by Williston:
".. . To hold otherwise may involve serious forfeiture, and
where this is clearly established, the application of equitable
principles should require an accounting for the excess of what
was received by the seller above the damages which the in-
jured party has suffered."6
Under such a policy, the defaulting purchaser would have a cause of
action only in the event that he could show that the down payment re-
tained by the seller was clearly in excess of any damage suffered by
him. However, where the down payment approximated the damage,
even though there might be some excess, a cause of action would not
lie.7
Other courts consider the nature of the breach on the part of the
plaintiff. Where the default is not due to his own willful or deliberate
choice, there is a strong tendency to grant relief, but where the default
is the result of his willful or deliberate choice, relief is generally de-
nied.8 The approach adopted by these courts seems well expressed in
a California supreme court ruling which stated:
"If a vendee does not complete his payments as stipulated in
his contract to purchase, the vendor may always retain the
moneys received by him, unless the vendee shows some equi-
table ground for relief, and it is not material whether or not
the contract stipulated that the vendor might retain such
money.. .When an equitable showing is not made to excuse
the breach, the vendor has the right in equity, as he always
had in law, to retain the moneys paid by the vendee."9
The equitable showing required by courts adopting this approach ap-
pears to be something more than the mere retention of money in excess
of the actual damage suffered. Although there is no Wisconsin case
directly in point involving forfeiture by a defaulting purchaser of
455 Corpus Juris 1084 (1931); Page, Law of Contracts (2nd Edition), Sec.
3261 (1920) ; Williston, Sales (2nd Edition), Sec. 599j (1924) ; Williston,
Contracts (Rev. Ed.), Sec. 1473 (1937).
5 Ibid., Page, Sec. 3266; Ibid., Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1476; Cherry Valley
Iron Works v. Florence Iron Co., 64 F. 569 (1894); Michigan Yacht Co. v.
Busch, 143 F. 929 (1906) ; Sabas v. Gregory, 91 Conn. 26, 98 A. 293 (1916).6 Ibid., Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1476.
7 Ibid.
855 Corpus Juris 1065-1067 (1931) ; 55 Amer. Jur. 927 (1943) ; Page, Law of
Contracts (2nd Ed.) Sec. 3261 (1920); Williston, Sales (2nd Ed.), Sec. 599j
(1924) involving conditional sales.
9 Glock v. Howard and Wilson Colony Co., 123 Calif. 1, 55 P. 713, 43 L.R.A. 199(1898); See also 24 R.C.L. 67-68; 27 R.C.L. 624.
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chattels, it would appear that Wisconsin courts would follow this
second approach. 0 However, it is well to point out, as noted by
Williston, that this approach which emphasizes the nature of the breach
is giving way in favor of one which stresses the benefit actually con-
ferred by the defaulting purchaser upon the seller."
JOHN RouiLLE
10 Walsh v. Fisher, 102 Wis. 172, 78 N.W. 437 (1899) ; Manitowoc Steam and
Boiler Works v. Manitowoc Glue Co., 120 Wis. 1, 97 N.W. 515 (1904);
Manning v. Fort Atkinson School District, 124 Wis. 84, 102 N.W. 356 (1905) ;
Manthey v. Stock, 133 Wis. 107, 113 N.W. 443 (1907); Oconto Co. v. Bacon,
181 Wis. 538, 195 N.W. 412 (1923).
1"Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.), Sec. 1476 (1937).
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